Fact: There is no immunity or protection against The Law of Scoreboards.
Corollary: You are crunchy and, with enough BBQ sauce, palatable.
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Drifter and Tsherry -- it is not only that these dysfunctional immigrant ghettos are close quarter living situations with perhaps less optimal hygiene. One would wager that the welfare culture has a lot of pre and actual diabetes and obesity along with sub-optimal diet in general. It would be interesting to see COVID-19 cases and poor infection outcomes as a percentage of the Medicaid and SNAP programs and other related welfare. There is probably a strong correlation which might explain places like NYC and similar.
Go into any welfare predominant community regardless of race and ethnicity and one will see medical problem from A to Z as well as obvious indicators of poor health.
Sad to say, and i have written it here before, to fix the cultural dysfunction from years of welfare it might be necessary for some communities to be placed under a custodial situation where lots of rights do not exist unless and until we help the people unlearn the poor habits bred into them over the past sixty years.
Old line: you break it, you bought it.
"Better to reign in Hell, than serve in Heaven," Satan's monologue in the first book of John Milton's Paradise Lost
Covers just the Chicom cover-up, still giving the pure BS "wet market" origin story along with the unlikely, far too late 1 Dec start date.
China's COVID Secrets (full documentary) | FRONTLINE
Feb 2, 2021
Gain-of-Function Research: Ethical Analysis
8 Aug 2016
Gain-of-function (GOF) research involves experimentation that aims or is expected to (and/or, perhaps, actually does) increase the transmissibility and/or virulence of pathogens. Such research, when conducted by responsible scientists, usually aims to improve understanding of disease causing agents, their interaction with human hosts, and/or their potential to cause pandemics. The ultimate objective of such research is to better inform public health and preparedness efforts and/or development of medical countermeasures. Despite these important potential benefits, GOF research (GOFR) can pose risks regarding biosecurity and biosafety.
A distinct aspect of the shift in debate from framing in terms of dual-use research ["dual-use" refers to technology that can be used for both peaceful and military purposes] to gain-of-function research has been focus on biosafety concernse.g., that a devastating pandemic could potentially result from a laboratory accident involving an especially dangerous pathogen created via GOFR. In light of Ron Fouchiers claim that the ferret-transmissible strain of H5N1 he produced is probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make (Enserink 2011) and (previous) NSABB chair Paul Keims claim that I cant think of another pathogenic organism as scary as this one [created by Fouchiers team] I dont think anthrax is scary at all compared to this (Enserink 2011), for example, some critics argued that the study in question should have been, and/or that future similar research should be, conducted in laboratories with the highest bio-containment leveli.e., biosafety level 4 (BSL-4), as opposed to BSL-3 (enhanced) in which this research was done (Swazo 2013).
1977 Russian Flu Pandemic
Strictly speaking, there was a fourth pandemic in the 20th century, an H1N1 strain which appeared in 1977. This was a "benign" pandemic, primarily involving persons born after the 1950, because the older population had protective immunity resulting from prior experience with H1N1 strains. The Russian Flu began in May 1977, when influenza A/H1N1 viruses isolated in northern China spread rapidly, and caused epidemic disease in children and young adults (< 23 years) worldwide. Russian, or later red influenza or red flu, first came to attention in November 1977, in the Soviet Union. However, it was later reported as having first occurred in northeastern China in May of that year. In May 1977, influenza viruses in northern China spread rapidly and caused epidemic disease in children and young adults.
By January 1978, the virus had spread around the world. From November 1977 through mid-January 1978 the population younger than 25 years in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics experienced a widespread epidemic of mild influenza (Russian flu) caused by an H1N1 virus similar to the virus that circulated worldwide during the early 1950s. Outbreaks of Russian flu occurred in school populations and military recruits in the United States starting in mid-January. Many other countries reported outbreaks of H1N1 virus in the winter of 1978.
The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate
American Society for Microbiology
July/August 2015 Volume 6 Issue 4
The 1977-1978 influenza epidemic was probably not a natural event, as the genetic sequence of the virus was nearly identical to the sequences of decades-old strains. While there are several hypotheses that could explain its origin, the possibility that the 1977 epidemic resulted from a laboratory accident has recently gained popularity in discussions about the biosafety risks of gain-of-function (GOF) influenza virus research, as an argument for why this research should not be performed. There is now a moratorium in the United States on funding GOF research while the benefits and risks, including the potential for accident, are analyzed. Given the importance of this historical epidemic to ongoing policy debates, we revisit the evidence that the 1977 epidemic was not natural and examine three potential origins: a laboratory accident, a live-vaccine trial escape, or deliberate release as a biological weapon. Based on available evidence, the 1977 strain was indeed too closely matched to decades-old strains to likely be a natural occurrence. While the origin of the outbreak cannot be conclusively determined without additional evidence, there are very plausible alternatives to the laboratory accident hypothesis, diminishing the relevance of the 1977 experience to the modern GOF debate.
Lab Accidents Prompt Calls for New Containment Program
Science - 28 May 2004
While breathing a sign of relief that the latest outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in China is over, health officials are still deeply troubled that they have not pinpointed the original source of the infection. They are also questioning whether research on the virus should be restricted to prevent further lab accidents.
Investigators are convinced that the infections in April involved two separate biosafety lapses within the Institute of Virology at China's Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Beijing. But they have been unable to pin down what went wrong. With four separate infections within the last year at three different institutions in Beijing, Singapore, and Taipei, *** health experts fear that the next SARS epidemic may be more likely to emerge from a research lab than from the presumed animal reservoir. ***
We need a global containment program for SARS, says Julie Hall, the World Health Organization (WHO) coordinator for communicable disease surveillance and response in Beijing. Such a program would involve reducing the number of labs working with the SARS virus and ensuring that the research is done by fully trained people in proper facilities with the right supervision, she says. It would be modeled on existing programs for smallpox and polio. She adds that discussions are just getting started and any program will take time to set up.
It is clear that the two researchers became infected in separate incidents. One was working with fragments of the SARS viral genome, which should not be able to cause disease. The other's research did not involve SARS at all. Hall says that the institute's biosafety level 3 lab, which WHO recommends for work involving viral cell cultures and manipulations involving growth or concentration of the SARS virus, is new, well-equipped, and capable of properly containing the virus. But the infections are believed to have occurred outside the biosafety level 3 area, where some research involving the inactivated or killed virus was apparently conducted.
SARS escaped Beijing lab twice
Laboratory safety at the Chinese Institute of Virology under close scrutiny
Apr 25, 2004
The latest outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in China, with eight confirmed or suspected cases so far and hundreds quarantined, involves two researchers who were working with the virus in a Beijing research lab, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Monday (April 26).
We suspect two people, a 26-year-old female postgraduate student and a 31-year-old male postdoc, were both infected, apparently in two separate incidents, Bob Dietz, WHO spokesman in Beijing, told The Scientist.
The woman was admitted to hospital on April 4, but the man apparently became infected independently 2 weeks later, being hospitalized on April 17. Both worked at the Chinese Institute of Virology in Beijing, part of China's Center for Disease Control.
China has level three research guidelines and rules in place for handling the SARS virus, which are of acceptable quality to WHO, Dietz told The Scientist. But it's a question of procedures and equipment. Frankly we are going to go in now a take a very close look, he said.
In the meantime, the lab has been closed, and the 200 staff have been put in isolation in a hotel near another lab in Cham Ping, about 20 kilometers North of Beijing. China is rushing its own investigative teams to check lab security, according to state media.
Antoine Danchin, an epidemiologist with the Hong Kong UniversityPasteur Research Center, who studied the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong, told The Scientist the latest incidents were probably the result of lab accidents.
Normally, it's not possible to contaminate people even under level two confinement, if the security rules are obeyed, with the appropriate hoods, and so on, Danchin said. SARS work requires level three. So it suggests there has been some mishandling of something.
The lab might have all the right rules, but the people may not comply! For example, notebooks are not supposed to be taken out, a lot of things like that. A virus doesn't jump on people! Danchin said. However WHO Beijing is relatively sanguine about the current threat, despite the fact that the 26-year-old infected had taken a long journey on the country's rail network. The index cases are known, and contacts had been traced, Dietz said. We see no significant public health threat at this point.
Inside Chinas [Wuhan] pathogen lab
Maximum-security biosafety facility nears approval, sparking excitement and concern.
23 Sep 2017
But worries surround the Chinese lab, too. The SARS virus has escaped from high-level containment facilities in Beijing multiple times, notes Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey. Tim Trevan, founder of CHROME Biosafety and Biosecurity Consulting in Damascus, Maryland, says that an open culture is important to keeping BSL-4 labs safe, and he questions how easy this will be in China, where society emphasizes hierarchy. Diversity of viewpoint, flat structures where everyone feels free to speak up and openness of information are important, he says.
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