The UK has apparently ordered Apple to provide it a means of access to all cloud data they have -- including that of users outside the UK, such as in the United States.
Citing anonymous sources, the Post reported that the British government’s undisclosed order was issued last month. It reportedly requires Apple to give officials blanket capability to view fully encrypted material.
The error here is the claim that it is "fully encrypted" material.
As I have repeatedly noted over the years any encryption system in which other than you has the keying is not secure. You are delegating that security to the other party (and they to you if it matters) each and every time you do that.
When you turn on a Google phone, for example, it does ask for a password. But it boots without it, so the operating system itself will run without that and in addition forced updates can be taken. Does this means the alleged "encryption" really is encryption with only you having the keying?
Not if it can be remotely unlocked, obviously; the keying is where the system can get to it. Thus the "encryption" is in fact about as secure as a TSA-approved lock on a suitcase!
Now take something like Geli on a FreeBSD system. If you attempt to boot such a machine you get a password prompt -- and there might be a second component required too (e.g. on a USB stick or "smart card.") Without all the components there is no way to derive the key and that's that.
Now you can still presumably compromise the loader (e.g. when it asks for the password) since that has to load unencrypted, which is why systems implement various "secure boot" paradigms -- which attempt to detect tampering with the bootloader. Those are not foolproof as if someone "with access" to sign a replacement bootloader does so you still get compromised -- when you key the password it can, of course, be stored.
Apple and Google have opted not to offer the choice to users of fully encrypted environments. That is, the phone (or computer) won't boot without the password and there's no way to remotely -- or locally, via USB or otherwise, do anything about that because the entire storage other than, perhaps a signed loader, is encrypted. That's still able to be compromised but its harder since now you have to get someone to run software that can grab and keep the keying information.
Modern encryption is very, very hard to actually break -- hard enough that for all intents and purposes the way you break it is by compromising the keying so you know what the key is.
Apple could have implemented their software in such a way that nobody other than you has the keying. Of course if you lose the keying in that circumstance you're boned -- there's nothing you can do and all the data is irretrievably gone. That's the price of such a decision of course, but its one users should have the capacity to make.
Had Apple done that then they could tell the UK "what you are ordering us to do is factually impossible as we don't have any of the keying nor can we acquire it -- this is intentional and we're not going to change said design."
That would leave the UK with only one option in that they could attempt to ban Apple from selling goods and services inside the UK but they cannot, as a nation, reach outside their territory with such an act since their sovereignty ends at their border.
This was the right choice originally before they got backed into a corner.