Mortgages written under all of these rules, where all the claimed facts are verified (e.g. income) are extremely safe. In fact, on average only about 1% of these loans will default over their life. There will be times that more defaults will occur (typically in serious recessions) but most of the time the default rate will be lower than 1%. In short, the average risk of the homeowner losing their house due to foreclosure with a loan under these guidelines is less than 1 in 100.
For each of these guidelines you violate, the risk goes up precipitously, especially in a poor economic environment.
Let's be clear - most mortgages are "safe" in a strong economy and they are even safer in a rapidly expanding home price environment, at least in terms of foreclosure. But in terms of risk to your personal financial future, this is not true.
For instance, let's say you take a 1 year ARM in an attempt to drop the payment a bit, so you can buy a bigger house. You figure that if the interest rate rises you will simply refinance into a conventional mortgage. And, three or four years later, that happens - and you do.
All is ok, right? Wrong. You just added three or four years onto your loan! What was a 30 year mortgage just became a 34 year mortgage. Do it again a couple of times and you have a payment when you retire at 65! This is not a good thing, but our short term thinking has blinded us to this reality.
Now let's look at the last seven years of the housing market.
In early 2000, the Tech Stock bubble imploded. Equities fell precipitously; the Dow and S&P500 each lost 50% of their value, while the Nasdaq fell by more than 75%. If you were invested in the market you took a severe haircut. Many people who were investing on margin were totally wiped out. I personally know several friends who had what they believed were safe retirement portfolios - each with far more than $1m in assets - ground into the dirt, losing more than 90% of their value. None of these individuals have recovered their losses, seven years later!
All that money left the market and went looking for somewhere to earn a return. Enter Alan Greenspan. In an attempt to prevent the ensuing recession from turning into a full-on depression, Greenspan cut interest rates to levels that left you with an effective negative rate. That is, the GDP growth exceeded the interest rate being charged! Effectively, the government didn't just print money, they paid you to borrow it! That little obscenity limited the recession to a historically short (and shallow) decline, but it also led to an immediate explosion of demand in the bond market for some way to earn a real return - see, bonds are linked to interest rates, and suddenly, there was no money to be made in Treasuries.
Responding to this demand and the flow of money at an effective negative interest rate banks and lenders started offering all sorts of creative mortgage products. Housing prices spiked due to demand - simply a matter of lots of buyers chasing too few homes. The next several years - up until about 2005 - saw price appreciation exceeding 20% in many markets on an annual basis, and some areas saw doubles year-over-year.
This made mortgage qualification a "no questions needed" game. If you borrowed money to buy a home and got in trouble, you could simply refinance into a new loan with some sort of "teaser" rate, even if you ended up negatively amortizing (that is, your principle balance was actually going UP!) This worked out because the house's value (according to sales of other homes near you) was going up faster than your debt - so the lender didn't care, as they had no risk. Don't pay, they come and take the house, selling it for more than you owed 'em.
But in early 2005 price appreciation came to a halt. All the people who wanted to buy homes already had them! What had replaced buying to live was buying to speculate - that is, the price appreciation had become so far above reason that now people of even very modest means were buying "pre-construction" condos and then, before the building was even completed, "flipping" them to someone else at a profit. Homes were bought, $10,000 worth of renovations put in, and sold for double what they had been purchased for, often to someone who sat on the property for another six months and then flipped it again! Eventually, as this cycle continued over a couple of years, prices go so high that people started to step back and evaluate exactly what they were in fact buying, and whether it could possibly continue. Increasingly, they came to the conclusion that this cycle had to end somewhere, and that they didn't want to be the "bagholder" when the music stopped! This dry up in the market began in the middle of 2005 - almost two years ago.
As the pool of good credit risks and flippers who were in and out of properties in under a year disappeared, lenders, anxious to keep the deal flow going (they are, after all, paid a percentage of each loan made - make no new loans, make no money!) loosened qualifications even more! Suddenly if you had a pulse you qualified. Lenders began qualifying your "debt to income" on the teaser rate - a rate that was GUARANTEED to go up in a year or less! In the majority of these cases the borrower would not have qualified at the fully indexed rate at all.
But this time around there was no price appreciation. Now, when these loans reset to a higher rate, the borrower is screwed. They cannot refinance out because their home is worth less than the mortgage balance, or at least, it exceeds the 80% limit for safe and responsible lending. Their debt to income ratio exceeds the 36% cap, when you try to qualify them at the fully-indexed rate.
Now not everyone who finds themselves in this position will default and lose their house. Many will, in fact, find a way to make the payments.
But this entire industry, with the exception of the "Subprime" lenders, is predicated on a default rate of 1% or less.
This was only true when economic times were good. Now, they're not so good. The leading economic indicators show a big slowdown in the economy. Inflation is running above target, leaving the Fed unable to cut rates. The exhaustion of buyers due to prices rising above their ability to afford new housing has caused a near stop in residential construction in the United States. THAT has led to layoffs in the homebuilding industry, which, of course, means those who worked in that industry now are out of work (many of them are illegal immigrants, so while they don't show up in the unemployment data, they sure do in the cash register!) This, in turn, is now leading to a slowdown in transportation and building materials (the first reports in both areas are just starting to show up.)
As this snowballs, and it not only will, it must, there will be more people out of work as the effects move up the supply chain. In addition, home prices are now falling in many markets, and there are estimates that on a national basis home prices will decline by as much as 5% this year.
You can no longer refinance out of a bad loan, nor, in many cases, can you sell your house to clear a bad mortgage.
A rapid - and accelerating - rise in defaults have led lenders to react by raising qualification standards - not far enough, but at least the move is in the right direction. Unfortunately that just makes the problem worse for those who are trapped, and for those lenders who have these poorly-made loans on their balance sheets.
Now you will - and have - heard that many of these organizations "have it under control." But do they? Let's take a quick look at some examples:
Everyone wants to say "oh, but the economy is roaring ahead and will save us."
Is it?
Anyone remember 2001? We were in the middle of a recessionary environment - the markets were in the tank, and yet unemployment was very low. How's that? Those jobs were "McJobs" - service sector employment which, while it provides you with a wage, doesn't give you much in the way of advancement possibility. Most telling, Business and Professional service employment (that is, GOOD jobs) along with manufacturing fell.
But wait - how can you have a recession with full employment? Well, you can't. But employment lags the economic picture by one to two years. It takes time for businesses to recognize a recession and lay off workers, cutting back their costs - and it also takes time for business to recognize expansion and hire to fill those jobs. As a consequence during the end of an expansion and the beginning of a recession employment data is always strong!
We just got the employment numbers this morning (Friday.) The headline number was 180,000 jobs gained, and while the equities markets are closed for Good Friday, the futures and bond markets are open. The futures immediately moved higher, suggesting that people liked that number in the equities markets.
But, just like all the recent economic data, you have to actually read the report to figure it out and you must understand how employment data is actually correlated with the economy.
Here's a few data points and facts from the actual data:
So let's see - we have "retail" jobs (which are low-wage) up, we have health care and education up (no big surprise there; boomers get sick, need care, etc), and we have a weather-smoothed reasonably steady commercial construction sector.
But both manufacturing (good wage) and business and professional services (good wage) jobs are experiencing net losses in employment.
There's no actual good news in here for the housing sector.
Again - employment is a lagging indicator of the economy, not a leading one.
Proof? How about a history lesson? In 2001 - the middle of the Tech Crash, when it was clear that there would be huge job losses (remember everyone screaming about how it was all Bush's fault?) unemployment was 4.1% - essentially above full employment. It was not until later in the year and going forward into mid 2003 - that that unemployment rise was apparent. The last recession began in March 2000, when unemployment was at its lowest level, under 4%, and was essentially over in November of 2001, at which point unemployment stood at 5.75% - and had another half-percent to rise through 2002 and into 2003, peaking in June!
During this entire time Democrats were screaming about a "jobless recovery." That screaming went on for TWO YEARS, from the date George Bush took office until roughly 2003 - when unemployment peaked and started downward.
But the recession was OVER in 2001!
So if you wish to be sanguine about the economy - and the markets - go right ahead.
I see four leading economic indicators pointing to a recession, none pointing to expansion, a jobs market that is behaving exactly as you would expect heading into a recession and a housing market in the tank.
What's not to love? Let's drive the DOW up another 200 points Monday so we can have an even bigger selloff when earnings season begins and the truth about the mortgage lenders and homebuilders becomes apparent!
Six months from now I believe you'll be wishing you were not fully-invested in equities.

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