Thursday, October 8. 2009Toward A Proper Liquidity MechanismI have promised a treatise on the proper regulation of liquidity in the economy from a perspective of avoiding both speculative credit bubbles and deflationary credit collapses. There have also been those who disagree with my definition of "money." I will therefore remove that term entirely, since "money" connotes different things to different people and we'll go through the definitions again:
From this we can determine certain relationships:
It is generally-accepted that significant inflation or deflation are undesirable. During significant inflation goods become more expensive relative to incomes. If there is sufficient labor pricing power to force coupling of these price increases back to wages, then a wage-price spiral ensues and can quickly get out of control, since labor is the predominant cost for most businesses. If there is insufficient labor pricing power to force coupling of price increases then the standard of living degrades for the citizens, in severe cases sufficiently to force a material part of the population into abject poverty. Significant deflationary events, on the other hand, bankrupt debtors as the real value of the currency used to pay their debts rises rapidly. This can quickly overwhelm their ability to pay, even when that debt was acquired for legitimate productive purpose. When these entities fail they discharge workers, forcing contraction of GDP which can in turn lead to further insolvencies as purchasing power declines in the population. This too can become self-reinforcing and lead to significant economic dislocation. It is often claimed that "hard money" is a natural check and balance on the tendency of fiat currency regimes to "run away" into an inflationary mess as a means of "printing" out of sovereign debt. The alternative, however (hard money), has a many-hundred-year history of causing forced inflationary and deflationary spikes that are extremely harmful to the economic climate of any nation, as is shown by the following chart found on Wikipedia: The inflationary and deflationary spikes are caused by the nature of "hard currency"; once dug out of the ground gold, for example, is not destroyed. When innovations in productivity outrun the ability to provision new currency reserves deflation ensues as the mining rate cannot keep up - the resulting deflation causes business and personal bankruptcies. This in turn causes a contraction in GDP but that cannot be balanced with a withdrawal of the currency base since it already exists! The result is a punishing swing between severe bouts of inflation and deflation; this is unacceptable. Yet the history of our fiat money regime as practiced to date, while perhaps "better" in terms of violence, certainly isn't in terms of bias, which is clearly inflationary, all the time. Why? Simple: Given the proclivity of "choice" the monetary authorities will always choose to try to paper over their friend's mistakes! This requires inflation, not deflation. Unfortunately such "papering over" ultimately leads to either a Weimar-style collapse or the utter destitution of huge percentage of the population, dependent only on whether wage-price coupling can occur. As inflation is a "silent tax", so long as it does not happen too suddenly people tend to react much as a boiled frog - that is, they don't realize what's going on until they're cooked! There are two competing issues - if you permit debt to rise faster than GDP over an extended period of time you will inevitably get a "runaway" condition and deflationary credit collapse. This occurs because of the mathematical reality of exponential ("compound growth") functions and no amount of tampering can change it if these relationships are maintained. The following chart demonstrates this phenomena: But regulating liquidity and thereby preventing this outcome and what is otherwise a mathematically-certain outcome can be done through a ministerial process. Let's go back to one of the charts I recently introduced - the Market Ticker Ponzi Finance Indicator: This indicator is simply the arithmetic difference in growth rates between GDP and systemic credit outstanding. If this indicator is positive then GDP is growing faster than (or shrinking slower than) credit in the system. If it is negative the opposite is the case. When the indicator is positive systemic stability in terms of debt coverage is improving, and likewise it is deteriorating when negative. Since the goal of liquidity regulation is to maintain systemic balance in debt coverage the mandate to be provided as a matter of law to whatever entity regulates liquidity in the monetary system is simple: The Ponzi Finance Indicator must be slightly positive. Implementation of this mandate is relatively simple, in that excursions beyond a modest negative value (e.g. -1%) denote severe monetary imbalances and produce asset bubbles. The 1990s Asset bubble in Internet Stocks was produced by the severe imbalance in credit and GDP growth in the mid 1980s that The Fed refused to correct, and the Housing Bubble was produced by the continuation of that imbalance from the late 1990s forward. The Fed's current policy, indeed, has spawned yet another asset bubble, this time in stocks which are trading at a completely preposterous 140 P/E ratio as of the end of September 2009, or roughly ten times the historical "fair" valuation. While many will argue that this is an unfair computation given the negative earnings from last year the fact remains that these negative earnings were real; even on a "current" basis of the second quarter alone the P/E is 122. This bubble, like all others, will burst with disastrous consequences. The solution to this problem is to place system liquidity regulation under a ministerial regime that is respondent only to the Ponzi Finance indicator (and to further mandate that GDP be honestly reported, as distortions in GDP will of course lead to improper adjustments), both as a matter of law. This will result in credit tightening on an automatic basis as long as credit growth is exceeding economic growth - that is, so long as market actors are using credit not for investment but rather to engage in ponzi-style consumption measured simply by the objective on-balance results of credit and output rates of change. Such a change in policy measure will put a permanent stop to the policy of "bailing out" financial institutions through lowering interest rates at the precise time when they have engaged in Ponzi-style financial maneuvers, creating unsustainable credit. It is precisely this cycle - the political demand to "cover bad bets" made through Ponzi-style financial manipulation, that ultimately, if left unchecked, leads to deflationary credit collapses or even destruction of a nation's currency. Fiat currency can work, but to do so the liquidity supply must be constrained such that credit growth is never allowed to outpace GDP. Simple sixth-grade mathematics prove this to be the case, and also prove that when this stricture is violated disaster will strike - we are left only to argue over how long we have before it occurs. Those who argue otherwise, whether on the public or private stage, are committing fraud upon the public and must be held to account for their criminal acts. Comments
Thursday, October 8. 2009Corruption: FHA Is Dying, Will Anyone Stop It?Let's cut the crap here with the claims that the "FHA is making sound loans:"
This is just plain pump-monkey nonsense. FHA currently requires 3.5% down. Remember that (contrary to the Realtard's assertions) all home purchases are instantly underwater by approximately 8% from their "purchase price" at closing, because typical Realtor commissions are 6% and closing costs, including title transfer, title insurance and doc stamps typically consume about 2% of the deal price. A home that must be immediately resold thus instantly "consumes" about 8% of the purchase price, and this deficiency persists over time, rising market or not. As such FHA loans are all immediately in negative equity at closing. If delinquency is running at 14% (which is 60 day+ only), or 22.9% (if you include 30 day lates) the fact remains that in order for the FHA to be "solvent" those problems must all occur after the loans go into positive equity status. Now one can argue that with conservative loan-to-value ratios the FHA won't lose its shirt. But even there the borrowers will unless the debt-to-income numbers are similarly conservative, and they are not, as I have previously documented. Indeed, in that particular loan I documented which did in fact fund the FHA was unlikely to take a loss (LTV under 70%) yet the borrower's debt to income was fifty-three percent - and that's on gross income, meaning pre-tax. The odds of that loan being sustainable and not resulting in the loss of the home for the borrower? Almost zero. So we have two problems here and yet the Realtor and FHA proponents don't want to talk about either. The first is that for FHA-funded purchases the 3.5% down payment results in a LTV of 96.5%, rendering the property and loan instantly upside down by roughly 5% at closing. Since the principal payments are near zero in all mortgages for the first few years a default in the first couple of years after origination will result in the FHA realizing an actual loss. If prices continue to decline those losses will, as a percentage of loan value, become ridiculously large in a huge hurry. In the second case, where refinances are taking place at reasonable LTVs (not the "streamline" refinances that are now authorized at up to 125%!) the FHA may not be exposed but the borrower sure is. The FHA's claim that it is practicing "conservative" underwriting is both a bad joke and a flat lie. Jeff Skilling went to prison for trying to run this sort of accounting at ENRON, yet we still have "government officials" doing the same thing at federal agencies. Back end "debt to income" ratios (DTIs) must be cut back to no higher than 36%, and CLTVs post-closing must be limited to 95%. For FHA loans this mandates a roughly 10% down payment, and refinances must be denied where post-closing, inclusive of all costs, the CLTV is over 90%. If the government wants to provide "rescue" financing for underwater (or "about to reset/recast") homeowners then they must force the original originating and/or securitizing bank to accept the writedown of principal to where these CLTVs are achieved - even if it bankrupts them. Comments
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Thursday, October 8. 2009Bernanke Under Fire: Grayson / PaulIn a letter to The Senate Banking Committee today Representatives Grayson and Paul demanded of Senator Dodd that Bernanke's reconfirmation hearing be suspended until The Fed provides answers to several questions, specifically:
I have been sharply critical of Representative Paul over the previous two years in The Ticker, mostly due to the fact that he has refused to display evidence that he "gets it", including questioning directed to Fed Chair Bernanke in multiple hearings since this crisis began. "Hard money", his "all the time, every time" issue will no more solve the problems our nation faces than will wishing for The Easter Bunny or believing in Santa Claus. But today I am forced to change my beliefs, at least in part. I don't know if Representative Grayson turned a light on or if Representative Paul simply woke up over the last couple of months, but what I see here before me is a substantive and welcome change. Now I want to challenge both Representatives Paul and Grayson, as well as the rest of the House and Senate, to consider the following points:
Given these facts we have choices to make as a nation. We can choose to continue that which has failed, or we can choose to reform the banking and financial system. We can insist that the banking and financial system face the following regulatory changes:
These four steps end the credit crunch tomorrow and prevent it from ever returning. They also end a number of large financial institutions tomorrow. That's ok - there are literally 330 million capitalists in this nation, some of whom will want to start new banks, and there are also thousands of community banks and credit unions that can operate within these rules. No, these steps will not bring back the "free credit" world of the 2000s. That is gone forever whether we like it or not. Credit will be available to worthy borrowers at a risk-adjusted interest rate that reasonably reflects the probability of default and inflation, plus a fair, demanded profit. This is how credit should have been for the past 230 years of this nation's history, and how it can be going forward. In addition The Federal Government must adjust its policies and operations, specifically:
The rest of the world is passing judgment on our nation's willingness and even ability to rein in the rampant financial fraud and outrageous acts that led us to this precipice. These nations are, quite realistically, looking to diversify away from the dollar for international transactions and as a reserve currency as they perceive that our government and business environment has become nothing more than a giant looting machine operated for the benefit of a handful of firms and people on Wall Street who have been and will be allowed to siphon off whatever they desire at everyone else's expense. Firms and individuals worldwide were sold well over a trillion dollars of worthless securities by these bad actors. Some of them, such as the Chinese and large foreign banks, appear to have received a "back door" bailout via unannounced and likely unlawful actions of The Fed, while others have been left to twist in the wind. Lehman was permitted to co-mingle customer margin funds with their own operating capital, resulting in billions of dollars of customer wealth that should not have been at risk being tied up in the bankruptcy courts, possibly for years, with a very real risk that it will never be returned to its rightful owners. At the same time The NY Fed may have have received their funds back immediately after the filing in violation of bankruptcy preference laws. Our banking system is currently hiding hundreds of billions in defaulted mortgage loans "off book" via exotic and undisclosed financial shenanigans. In the instances where these properties are being disposed of huge losses, often in excess of 50%, are being realized - yet this is not being recognized as the "mark" on similar securities held by other institutions as it should be. This is presenting a false view of financial institution health, but more importantly it is severely constraining credit as consumers trapped in these homes where banks are refusing to proceed to foreclosure are unable to proceed to rebuild their credit while the banks are stuck with an "asset" they are refusing to sell at its market price, clogging up their credit origination capacity. Worse, those institutions that are disposing of these "assets" have first put in place "loss-share" arrangements where the FDIC or Treasury is in fact "eating" 90 or 95% of the losses - meaning that the loss of value in these assets (houses) is being distributed as a tax to all Americans! The banks that distributed these "profits" to shareholders and executives on the way up have managed to set up a "heads we win and keep it, tails you lose and eat it" circumstance - but only for them. For the homeowner he's bankrupted by these shenanigans and those who refused to participate in the fraud get the tax bill. We can choose to address these problems now or we can continue to march toward the abyss. The loss of confidence in our government, in our regulatory agencies and indeed in our currency is on the brink of becoming disorderly. Should that point be reached it will be too late to take remedial action and our nation will be forced to suffer the (well-deserved) consequences of our willful blindness to these outrageous acts of looting, all of which will come raining down on American consumer's heads. We the people must insist on better and hold our lawmakers feet to the fire. If the Washington DC politicians will not do their jobs then we must in turn insist that our state lawmakers do so - including, if necessary, by enforcement of our State 10th Amendment rights. Comments
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