Well, the document is finally out. Of course this is not legislation; that will happen on The Hill. But we get to read and comment, and with 85 pages in here there's a lot of meat. Let's get right to it:
The roots of this crisis go back decades. Years without a serious economic recession bred complacency among financial intermediaries and investors. Financial challenges such as the near-failure of Long-Term Capital Management and the Asian Financial Crisis had minimal impact on economic growth in the U.S., which bled exaggerated expectations about the resilience of our financial markets and firms. Rising asset prices, particularly in housing, hid weak credit underwriting standards and masked the growing leverage throughout the system.
Well, no. Fraud hid the growing leverage and weak underwriting standards. The fact that credit raters and issuers failed to disclose clearly, for example, that missing data was literally guessed at when models were run was part of the problem. "Shopped" ratings were another. Gross overstatement of income was another issue - half of all "stated income" loans had overstatements of 50% or more. But despite HUD knowing about this in 2007, nothing was done. Fraud was not just found in the lenders and securitizers, it was also found in the government's intentional blindness and misconduct.
Households saw significant increases in access to credit, but those gains were overshadowed by pervasive failures in consumer protection, leaving many Americans with obligations that they did not understand and could not afford.
Government and The Fed intentionally blew the housing bubble after the Internet collapse, willfully looking the other way while consumers were sold products that were dangerous to their financial health.
Investment banks were permitted to opt for a different regime under a different regulator, and in doing so, escaped adequate constraints on leverage.
That's a lie. Henry Paulson came before the SEC twice to have leverage limits removed before he became Treasury Secretary - once unsuccessfully in 2000, and again successfully in 2004. Both Bear and Lehman were covered by those standards, both had them removed, and both blew up with more than double the former legal leverage limit. Despite his promotion of this unsound change in regulation, he not only was appointed to Secretary of The Treasury he was not fired when the scandal and collapse broke. Those are the facts.
New authority for the Federal Reserve to supervise all firms that could pose a threat to financial stability, even those that do not own banks.
The Federal Reserve absconded in its regulatory capacity throughout this entire crisis, including issuing 23A exemption letters like candy in 2007 and 2008. If anything The Fed has created risk, not mitigated it. Now you propose to grant them more power when they are clearly drunk on the power they already have and are incapable of or unwilling to discharge their regulatory responsibilities?
When asset prices started to fall and market liquidity froze, firms were forced to pull back from lending, limiting credit for households and businesses.
You refuse to see the problem for what it is and as a consequence this program will cause harm instead of help and ultimately fail.
Specifically, the problem is too much debt for the level of income available to service it. This cannot be corrected by spurring "more lending"; there is no more borrowing capacity!
Debt-based consumption has been pressed to the limit of capacity and beyond, which is now expressing itself in massive default rates.
The capacity to spend beyond income has been exhausted and cannot be restarted. We must recognize the economic reality of this and reset our expectations for GDP and income, both personally and by the government, to reflect reality.
Under our proposals, the largest, most interconnected, and highly leveraged institutions would face stricter prudential regulation than other regulated firms, including higher capital requirements and more robust consolidated supervision. In effect, our proposals would compel these firms to internalize the costs they could impose on society in the event of failure.
This is a positive change. It also serves as a natural check and balance on size that counteracts the ability to otherwise squash smaller competitors through various anti-competitive acts. While we should really play "trust-buster" (and I expect we will at some point) this is a good start.
We will propose legislation to amend Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to require the prior written approval of the Secretary of the Treasury for any extensions of credit by the Federal Reserve to individuals, partnerships, or corporations in "unusual and exigent circumstances. "
That's nice. What makes you think they'll obey the law? They don't now.
Specifically, Section 13(anything) only allows extension of credit in "unusual and exigent" circumstances. It does not permit the purchase of equity interest.
Section 14 deals with that, and of instruments that have duration of more than six months it requires the securities bear "full faith and credit" to be eligible for purchase.
Yet all three "Maiden Lane LLCs" are stuffed full of assets without that guarantee, as is nearly one trillion dollars of GSE debt that The Fed has purchased.
All of this is blatantly unlawful, yet there has been no enforcement.
Until existing law is followed, why would anyone believe The Fed will adhere to any new requirement?
Sections 23A and 23B accomplish these purposes by placing quantitative limits and collateral requirements on certain covered transactions between a bank and an affiliate and by requiring all financial transactions between a bank and an affiliate to be performed on market terms. The Federal Reserve administers these statutory provisions for all depository institutions and has the power to provide exemptions from these
The Fed has handed out exemptions to 23A like candy. This practice must end as it has dramatically increased systemic damage when a firm subsequently fails or falls under severe stress. If you cannot make it under the published rules, the firm should be resolved, not given a pass.
CEOs and Directors allow banks to get into these positions because they know that "Uncle Fed" will ride to the rescue with a 23A exemption if there's a problem. That must end as this practice creates systemic risk.
Finally, there are the items that are just flat-out missing. Most-glaring among them is the lack of a ban on off-balance-sheet vehicles such as conduits and SIVs. If there is one thing that ENRON taught us it is that these vehicles are the hiding places for fraud, abuse, and mis-marked assets where investors, auditors and regulators cannot easily find them.
Bluntly put these loopholes must be closed and off-balance-sheet vehicles prohibited outright: if you have an economic interest in something, it must be consolidated on your balance sheet so that both auditors and investors know what you're holding, how much you're holding, and the potential impact on your firm's finances from that holding.
While this proposal has many good features contained within it, it falls short in important areas. If the Obama Administration is truly interested in financial regulatory reform those "holes" in the proffered document must be closed as the legislative process works its way through Congress.