The revisions to GDP published this morning have turned to disgustingly nasty one of my favorite charts. Specifically, this one:
You've all seen this a dozen times. Well, here's what it looks like with the revised GDP numbers "corrected" in the Excel file:
"Holy Sheeit" doesn't even begin to describe this.
These are notsmall changes, but they also mark the desperation of our government to avoid recognition of even a tiny, 2% annualized decrease in GDP!
That's right folks - "as-reported", the maximum y/o/y "depression" that garnered the title "Great Recession" was a minuscule 2% decrease in REPORTED nominal GDP.
But look at the policy response. Oh, and that last dot - it's estimated, based on the 2Q preliminary GDP numbers (which are almost-certainly too "hot" and the debt numbers (almost-certainly too "cold".)
In addition the revisions make clear that there was in fact a zero real growth rate in 2006! There was your warning.... and likely why we had the nice little dump in the market starting in the early part of 2007.
(Revisions only go back to the e/o/y 2006 numbers.)
If you look to the 2003-2007 period for a clue as to how our government will respond, you're in for a stunner - there will be no material decrease in deficits while economic "recovery" on a nominal scale will be unlikely to go beyond 4% on a reported basis.
At this rate we're gonna be Greece - and sooner than you think.
They studied abstract economies in which the monetary policymaker follows an active Taylor-type monetary policy rule, that is, the policymaker changes nominal interest rates more than one-for-one when ination deviates from a given target. Active Taylor-type rules are so commonplace in present day monetary policy discussions that they have ceased to be controversial. Benhabib, et al., also emphasized the zero bound on nominal interest rates. They suggested that the combination of an active Taylor-type rule and a zero bound on nominal interest rates necessarily creates a new long-run outcome for the economy. This new long-run outcome can involve deation and a very low level of nominal interest rates. Worse, there is presently an important economy that appears to be stuck in exactly this situation: Japan.
Yep.
But this is where Bullard loses his connection to reality. He goes on to opine:
Taken at face value, the Taylor-type policy rule has been fairly successful for the U.S.: Inflation (by this measure) has not been above three percent nor, until very recently, below one percent, during the January 2002 to May 2010 period.
Well, taken at face value with inflation numbers intentionally distorted, and thus policy rates set at the behest of intentionally falsified data, one can conclude nothing of value - other than that when you put garbage into a formula, you get garbage back out.
Need I remind Bullard that our inflation numbers (and indeed the OECD's) are all tainted? That until President Clinton we had much-more reliable ones, but even those were manipulated. For instance, counting "owner's equivalent rent" instead of house prices, when a majority of households in fact have fee-simple real estate in their name, is beyond foolish - it's intentionally fraudulent.
Many of the responses to this situation described below attempt to remedy this situation by recommending a switch to some other policy in cases when inflation is far below target. The regime switch required has to be sharp and credible. policymakers have to commit to the new policy and the private sector has to believe the policymaker. Unfortunately, in actual policy discussions nothing of this sort seems to be happening.
.....
I conclude that promises to keep the policy rate near zero may be increasing the risk of falling into the unintended steady state of Figure 1, and that an appropriate quantitative easing policy o¤ers the best hope for avoiding such an outcome.
And here is where Bullard goes entirely off the rails.
"Quantitative Easing", if really practiced, is nothing other than unbacked emission of currency. It is in fact unlawful for The Federal Reserve to engage in this policy.
Scott Garrett made this point when questioning Bernanke recently on The Hill - by "buying" MBS, which in fact do not have a full faith and credit guarantee in perpetuity, Bernanke has set himself to potentially take an action that he is Constitutionally prohibited from taking.
This, incidentally, is why the Federal Reserve Act requires Bernanke to only buy instruments with that guarantee. Bernanke's reliance on the CFRs, which he cites and which apply only to Section 13, that is, discount or loan operations, as justification for purchases of Fannie and Freddie paper of any sort is bereft of validity in that it both violates the black-letter law of The Federal Reserve Act but in addition is unconstitutional on its face - a fact that cannot be fixed with federal regulation - fixing it would require a Constitutional Amendment or a Statute passed by Congress explicitly authorizing the type and amount of "money printing" that The Fed wanted to engage in.
But here's the general problem that Bullard ignores and which is fatal to his argument: Unbacked emission of currency is a death spiral from which you will not escape.
The danger in such a pronouncement is that if it is believed private capital lending instantly ceases, because while your avowed claim is to make "inflation" positive what you're doing is diluting the existing currency without any promise - or ability to deliver - that the outcome will be what and where you want it to be.
In order for such a pronouncement to be credible you must promise to do "whatever it takes" to reach your goal. But "whatever it takes" might be wildly dilutive to existing currency stores, and in fact mathematically it always is in any system where material amounts of credit are outstanding against that currency. In this case there is about $50 in credit for each dollar in currency, so a "money printing" regime to establish a 2% inflation rate from zero would require something on the order of one trillion dollars of emission, or a 50% dilution!
The problem with such a dilution is that it is both permanent and immediate, and lenders of private capital will discern that this is wildly out of whack with what they lent. That is, the lender of capital is entirely within his reasonable belief that the dilution is not 1 or 2% (which he can price for), but fifty percent, which he cannot. He thus immediately leaves the market with his funds.
On a micro level this doesn't seem to be such a catastrophe. But on a macro level it is, because the $53 trillion in loans in the market have duration, and must be rolled. If the average duration is ~5 years in the marketplace for the entire $53 trillion (probably reasonable in aggregate as an estimate) then each year some $10 trillion must roll over.
But with the private lender's wallet snapped closed, the government is now faced with a horrifying problem: there is now $10 trillion of credit that comes due to be rolled, but there are no lenders.
Now what?
The only solution available to the central bank (or the government) in this case is to emit the entire $10 trillion!
But if you do that - just once - then you can bet the other $40 trillion will not roll either.
So let's see the practical effect here - the government and/or central bank is forced to emit the entirety of the outstanding credit base as unbacked currency in order to prevent an immediate deflationary credit collapse. Yet by definition replacing $50 of credit for each dollar of circulating currency would cause a devaluation of some 98%. That is, the $DX, or dollar index, would go from 81 to about 1.6.
No, that last number isn't a misprint.
This would be the literal destruction of the currency.
Incidentally, this is exactly what happened in Weimar, and it is exactly what happened in Zimbabwe.
Why doesn't this happen with the expansion of credit - that is, the Federal Reserve loaning against the emission of Treasuries?
That's simple: The emission of unbacked credit is a naked short against the currency system. That is, it is a promise to pay with something you don't have, but think you can acquire. A secured loan (where the security is worth more than the borrowed amount) carries no such implication, as there is an offsetting asset you are borrowing against. In effect, a secured loan is a liquidity facility, not a credit facility, while an unsecured loan is pure credit - the promise to pay tomorrow for what you wish to eat today, when you have no means to purchase with accumulated surplus at the present time.
Bullard, along with the rest of The Fed, is desperately grasping with his fingernails at a rapidly eroding ledge. The Fed and Congress, in collusion, have put forward policies that resulted in the unbacked emission of credit dramatically beyond owned assets. This caused "prices" to rise dramatically for those very same assets, even though their utility value was not improved.
That is, actual production did not take place to turn a raw good into a finished one with enhanced utility value; rather, a Ponzi Scheme was spawned and maintained where the only increase in value was perceptive.
But all of this unbacked credit emission comes with interest due and payable. When the amount of carried interest obligation reaches the total surplus that the borrower is able to produce, he goes bankrupt. Now the very cycle that led to perceptive increases in value (as opposed to utility value) unwinds. This is the nature of all naked shorts - they are self-limiting as the underlying mathematical foundation has not changed - only perception changed.
The only solution to this problem is to let the perceptive value change unwind. Policymakers, of course, do not like this course of action, as it would force them to admit that they were complicit in intentionally fostering a false belief in the value of various assets - and thus the supposed "wealth" of the population was a chimera - a phantom - a fraud.
In turn it reveals that the supposed "profits" earned by those in the financial system for packaging and "intermediating" all of this faux wealth was nothing other than a sophisticated asset-stripping scheme, founded on that very same fraud, and which came into being at the explicit behest and creation of those very same policymakers!
I wish Bullard luck in his endeavor to cover up the policy acts of the Federal Reserve and Government. He's going to need it, because every indication I have in the metrics I follow say that there is no possible way he can come up with a credible policy move that meets his claimed desires.
The only credible choices that remain before us are to accept the unwind of Ponzi-enhanced "values", or destroy our currency and political system through further puerile and intentionally-fraudulent attempts to conceal the truth.
"Defendant Merscorp, Inc., is a foreign corporation created in (on?) or about 1998 by conspirators from the largest banks in The United States in order to undermine and eventually eviscerate long-standing principles of real property law....
MERS is the RICO enterprise and is the primary innovation through which the conspirators, including the Defendants, have accomplished their illegal objectives as detailed throughout this complaint.
Well, well, well.... read the rest of the complaint - it's good. Specifically, it appears they managed to get the "signer" of a large number of these documents (who claims to be an officer of MERS) to admit that she is in fact not a corporate officer, and in fact doesn't even know who the corporate secretary of the company is!
On it's face, the complaint looks pretty ugly.
I'll be watching to see how the case develops; if you remember my previous articles about MERS, I put forward the belief that what they had attempted to do was end-run around the statutory requirements of several states with regard to assignment and recordings for real property, not to mention potentially the laws relating to trusts and assignments "in blank" (effectively, the creation of bearer paper, which has a whole host of related issues.)
Real gross domestic product -- the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States -- increased at an annual rate of 2.4 percent in the second quarter of 2010, (that is, from the first quarter to the second quarter), according to the "advance" estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the first quarter, real GDP increased 3.7 percent.
Well, so they say. That's first estimate. Remember that BEA's average "overstatement" of late seems to be running in the 20-30% range .vs. reality when the finals are in. So if we apply that sort of discount, we're well under 2.0, which will be admitted once all is said and done (and you've forgotten about the orgasmic response of the CNBS pump monkey clowns.)
Final sales of computers added 0.04 percentage point to the second-quarter change in real GDP after adding 0.10 percentage point to the first-quarter change. Motor vehicle output subtracted 0.01 percentage point from the second-quarter change in real GDP after adding 0.74 percentage point to the first-quarter change.
And again, .vs. the spooging that CNBS is doing right now about "Cars", the report says that motor vehicle output SUBTRACTED from GDP this quarter.
The price index for gross domestic purchases, which measures prices paid by U.S. residents, increased 0.1 percent in the second quarter, compared with an increase of 2.1 percent in the first. Excluding food and energy prices, the price index for gross domestic purchases increased 0.9 percent in the second quarter, compared with an increase of 1.6 percent in the first.
Pay more, have less. That'll work out great, right?
Real personal consumption expenditures increased 1.6 percent in the second quarter, compared with an increase of 1.9 percent in the first. Durable goods increased 7.5 percent, compared with an increase of 8.8 percent. Nondurable goods increased 1.6 percent, compared with an increase of 4.2 percent. Services increased 0.8 percent, compared with an increase of 0.1 percent.
How the hell is that possible with unemployment up around 10%? Oh wait, I found it.
Real federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment increased 9.2 percent in the second quarter, compared with an increase of 1.8 percent in the first. National defense increased 7.4 percent, compared with an increase of 0.4 percent. Nondefense increased 13.0 percent, compared with an increase of 5.0 percent. Real state and local government consumption expenditures and gross investment increased 1.3 percent, in contrast to a decrease of 3.8 percent.
Ah, so the Federal Government, despite claims by the Obama Administration that "deficits will come down" and similar lies, in fact dramatically increased non-defense spending.
Further, States and local governments, even though they have no money, increased spending too. Yes, that pretty green sky is an approaching tornado, and it's labeled "state and local insolvencies."
The change in real private inventories added 1.05 percentage points to the second-quarter change in real GDP after adding 2.64 percentage points to the first-quarter change. Private businesses increased inventories $75.7 billion in the second quarter, following an increase of $44.1 billion in the first quarter and a decrease of $36.7 billion in the fourth.
Oh, so fairly close to half of the GDP "increase" was in fact due to inventory build. Guess what happens to you when you build inventories that you later can't sell? Hint: The first letter is "B".
The personal saving rate -- saving as a percentage of disposable personal income -- was 6.2 percent in the second quarter, compared with 5.5 percent in the first.
That's a load of crap. BEA calls "personal savings" the mathematical forumula "Income - spending = savings." Uh huh. Paying off your credit card is "savings", according to the BEA.
Then we have revisions.
For 2006-2009, we now have a decrease net-net, as opposed to being flat.
All three years of the revision period were revised down. Again, if a mistake or inaccuracy (as opposed to intentional falsehood) is responsible for errors, one would expect them to be normally distributed - that is, some would be positive, some negative. This is obviously not the case.
Is there any good news in the report? Well, yes - there was a material uptick in non-residential fixed investment, centered around equipment and software. How much of this is a normal replacement cycle (deferred last year) and how much signifies real expansion is an open question and one not easily answered. However, I wouldn't call this particularly "robust", despite the pump monkey characterization this morning in the media.
The drops in some of the previously-published numbers were, however, simply stunning. For example, PCE (personal consumption) was previously reported for Q1/2010 as 2.13. The revision is 1.33, a thirty percent downward revision. That's not an error, it was a falsehood.
Worse was the services false report. The previous reported number for Q1/2010 was 0.69. Revised was 0.03, a downward revision of ninety-five percent.
The services revision backward was truly sickening - the entirety of 2009 was negative with the exception of the fourth quarter, where all but the first was previously reported positive, and the changes were ridiculous. First quarter was revised down from -0.13% to -0.75%, second from +0.09% to -0.79%, and so on. Again,that's not an error, it's a lie.
Needless to say when I get all my graph source data updated, it's going to look worse than it did - including my "government ponzi support" graph, one of my favorites.
The futures are diving on the report, as well they should. Not because it's bad - but because the entirety of the 2009 data set was a bald-faced lie.
There's a rumor going around that Fannie and Freddie (remember, government-owned GSEs? Yep) are cooking up a plan to provide "instant refis" to everyone with a Fan/Fred mortgage that is current, effectively refinancing them to current rates.
This sounds like a huge win for everyone.
But of course it's not - there is never any such thing as "win for everyone." Someone always loses.
Let's remember how a mortgage-backed bond works. You take a bunch of mortgages, then slice and dice 'em into bonds. The bonds are sold; the investor pays for the bond, and then gets an interest coupon until maturity, at which point the bond principal is paid back.
With mortgages there are a lot of games played because unlike a regular bond that has defined call provisions (if any) a mortgage can prepay at any time, removing it from the pool. This creates a duration problem for the seller which is accounted for in various ways.
One of the ugly little things I've been suspicious of for a couple of years now is that the capital accounts on these notes may be "silently" deficient. That is, let's say you have 100 mortgages with an aggregate "face" of $200,000 each (average.) You thus have a $20 million "face" bond there (all this ignores your "vig"; don't get all technical on me :-))
Let's say the aggregate coupon you owe on that bond is 5%. So you have to come up with $1 million a year to pay the interest to the holders. In theory, as each note prepays or pays off, the capital account has been stacking back those funds, so when the bond retires, you can hand the principal back.
But what if some of the notes aren't paying?
Well, at first blush, you're dead, because the coupon "inbox" from the mortgagees is short. But in fact some of them have prepaid - which means that if you're not being honest you could raid the capital "box" and make the interest payments with it. Who's the wiser, up until the bond matures and suddenly the money that's supposed to be there to return to the investors is missing?
I know, I know, this can't happen. Uh huh. Pull the other one folks. How many little games have been played over the last three years with accounting? Why not here?
Now here's the problem: If Fan/Fred were to implement such a "refinance/prepay" program, suddenly all the performing loans will immediately roll off. All that's left is the non-performing ones.
Now if, and I stress "if", that sort of deceptive game up above has been played, it suddenly becomes exposed, as the capital account is dramatically deficient, and it's "game over" for those holders.
It might also be fun trying to separate out the actual prepay risk and problem with the value of these notes and the results of this sort of game.
Now again - I can't tell you it's happened, because I have no access to the security-level books and flows from the homeowners through the servicers and then through Fan and Fred. But it would certainly explain why we have the sort of delinquency numbers we've seen and yet we haven't seen huge hits to the securities issued by Fan and Fred. Remember, these guys are informally insolvent (in "Conservatorship") and while their losses have been big, I am having trouble squaring the claimed loss amounts (about 2% of their book) and the amount of funding that Treasury claims it has provided to them.
If I'm right about this - and remember - this is speculation - then some of those note-holders are about to get a truly ugly surprise, and we're also about to be treated to whether Treasury's alleged "promise" to back them was worth the breath that Geithner spent to mouth it.
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